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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MAY BIGLER,
Applicant/Petitioner,
vs.
:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
T.W. SERVICES, INC., and
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO.,

Case: 950838-CA
Priority Classification 7

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER MAY BIGLER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-86
(1988) as this is an appeal from a final Order of the Industrial Commission.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether the Industrial Commission improperly interpreted and applied the law
relative to the higher standard of causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) in light of the uncontested facts of the Applicant's injury.
The standard of review is correction of error in erroneous interpretation or
application of the law. Section 63-46b-16(4)(c), U.C. A. and King v. Industrial

Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). There is no specific or implied grant of
discretion to the Industrial Commission in the interpretation of the law. See King, id.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
We are not aware of any statutes or rules that are determinative in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural History
May Bigler filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission on
March 24, 1994, seeking compensation and benefits for a low back injury that occurred
at work on March 11, 1993 (R. at 4).
Mrs. Biglerfs claim was heard before an Administrative Law Judge of the
Industrial Commission on August 8, 1994. The ALJ issued Interim Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on August 17, 1994. In this order, the ALJ found and
concluded that Mrs. Bigler had met her burden of legal causation (R. at 21-30). As a
result, the matter was referred to a medical panel appointed by the Industrial
Commission to consider the contested medical issues of the claim (R. at 32-34). Soon
thereafter, the medical panel met with the Petitioner and issued a report (R. at 35-44).
The resulting report of the medical panel was circulated to the parties on December 22,
1994 (R. at 45). Timely objections to the medical panel's report were filed by the
Defendants' counsel but no hearing was requested thereon (R. at 48-83). Thereafter on
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March 24, 1995 the ALJ issued her final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order. This Order awarded benefits to Mrs. Bigler (R. at 93-101).
Following the grant of an extension of time, the Defendants filed a timely
Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on May 26, 1995 and the Petitioner
responded on June 12, 1995 (R. at 105-169). The Order Granting Motion for Review
was issued by the Commissioners of the Industrial Commission on September 29, 1995
(R. at 170-173). This order denied the Petitioner's claim by concluding that Mrs.
Bigler's actions resulting in her injury did not meet the higher causational standard
required by Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) of a person with
a pre-existing back condition.
The Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 1995
(R. at 174-177). An Order Extending Time for Reconsideration allowing the Industrial
Commission until December 8, 1995 to issue a decision was entered on November 3,
1995 (R. at 183-185). The Industrial Commission's Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration was issued on December 7, 1995 (R. at 186-188).
The Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on December
29, 1995.

Factual History
1.

Petitioner May Bigler was employed as a cashier with Respondent TW

Services as of March 11, 1993. The company provides an on-site lunch room/cafeteria
for employees at Discover Card. Mrs. Bigler was working about 35 hours a week at
the time and had been with the Defendant for about a year. (R. at 415-416).
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2.

On March 11, 1993, Mrs. Bigler was standing next to her cash register

in the lunch room and was talking with her supervisor who was on the other side of the
counter. Her work station consisted of a cash register on a waist high counter situated
between two long counters of similar height that ran behind it. These counters allowed
patrons on either side to slide their lunch trays toward the cash register to pay for their
food (R. at 380-382, 417). The counter was about 2 1/2 feet across (R. at 381). Mrs.
Bigler was situated somewhat to her left of the cash register. (R. at 440-441). To her
right on the opposite side of the counter on which the cash register sat was a glass menu
board holding an 8" x 11" piece of paper advertising cafeteria specials (R. at 417-418,
401).
3.

At one point in her conversation with her supervisor, Mrs. Bigler

noticed that the menu board was starting to fall forward to the floor. Without thinking
she made a sudden lunge from the left to the right across the counter to attempt to catch
the falling board with her right hand (R. at 418-419, 440-441). She was unable to do
so and the glass in the board shattered on the floor (R. at 401). The force of the sudden
dive for the board resulted in her falling on the counter with one of her feet off the
floor (R. at 419). She felt immediate sharp pain in her lower back with pain and
numbness radiating into her left leg (R. at 420). This sudden jerk for the menu board
involved twisting the waist about 25° to the right while quickly lunging forward across
the counter to the right, this resulted in her falling up against the counter at which point
there was the immediate onset of pain (R. at 419).
4.

Mrs. Bigler's medical history shows evidence of preexisting degenerative

disk disease in the lumbar and thoracic spine, among other things (R. at 269). The
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parties do not dispute the existence of her preexisting conditions. At the time of the
incident in question, the Petitioner was 56 years old, stood 5'6" tall and weighed 160
lbs (R. at 37). Before entering the work force in about 1991 or 1992 she had been a
homemaker during her adult life. Defendant TW Services was her first employer (R. at
361).
5.

The medical panel doctors who examined Mrs. Bigler at the request of

the ALJ concluded that a medically demonstrable causal relationship exists between her
back problems and the March 11, 1993 industrial injury. They determined a period of
temporary total disability from the date of the accident in March of 1993 to April of
1994. She was given a 5% impairment rating for her low back with 1/3 of it due to the
industrial accident. She was also given a 5 % impairment rating for a somataform pain
disorder due to the industrial accident. (R. at 35-44). The findings of the medical panel
were adopted by the A.L.J, in her findings of fact (R. at 96).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission used too restrictive of an analysis in interpreting and
applying the law of the Allen case to the circumstances of Mrs. Bigler's claim. The
intensity or violence of the act or exertion that resulted in injury is critical in
considering whether the act meets the higher standard of legal causation required of
someone with a preexisting condition. The facts, as adopted by the Industrial
Commission lead to the conclusion that Mrs. Bigler did meet her burden of establishing
legal causation.

5

ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission Improperly
Interpreted and Applied the Law Relative to the Higher Standard
of Causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission
Upon the Respondents' Motion for Review, the Commissioners of the Industrial
Commission reversed the order of the A.L.J, and ruled that Mrs. Bigler's accident was
not compensable. Their rationale was that her actions did not meet the higher exertion
standards required by the Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986),
decision This overruled the conclusions of the A.L.J, that the Petitioner's exertions did
meet the higher standard.
To meet the legal causation requirement, the Allen decision requires a claimant
with a pre-existing condition to "show that the employment contributed something
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition." Allen. 729 P.2d at 25.
This requirement helps to distinguish between injuries which
(a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition
results in symptoms which appear during work hours without any
enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those injuries which occur
because some condition or exertion of employment increases the risk of
injury which the worker normally faces in everyday life.
Allen, id.
The Court in Allen recognized that the issue must be determined on the facts of
each case. Allen at 25. The facts are not in dispute here. The Commissioners adopted
the factual findings of the A.L.J, in their Order Granting Motion for Review (R. at
171).
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We submit that the law was improperly applied by the Commissioners to the
facts of this case. Their interpretation of Allen is unnecessarily restrictive and not in
line with the meaning and intent of the law.
As stated in Allen, "[T]he key question in determining causation is whether
given this body and this exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to the injury."
Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 801 P.2d 179 (Utah App. 1990),
quoting from Allen at 24.
The A.LJ. made the following factual findings relative to the exertions in
question:
The applicant testified that she was standing in front of the
register and somewhat to the left of it when she noticed the menu start to
fall off the counter on the other side of the register. The Applicant
stated that she twisted suddenly to the right and lunged forward to try to
catch the falling menu. As she did so, she needed to reach across the
end of the counter on the right side of the register with her right hand.
The applicant stated that this action was done very suddenly in an
attempt to catch the falling menu. She was unable to catch the menu, but
felt a sharp pain in her low back at approximately the belt line as she
lunged and reached at the same time...
(R. at 23).
The record shows further that she fell across the counter to her right side (R. at
441). As she made this sudden jerk or lung, the Petitioner testified that her right foot
went off the floor as well (R. at 419). There is no dispute that her movements to
attempt to catch the falling board were very quick and sudden. The A.L.J, found this
to be a high-energy activity.
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We submit that the quality or intensity or violence of the action resulting in
injury can be critical to the determination of whether the higher standard for
establishing legal causation is met.
The evidence in the record before the Industrial Commission shows this to have
been a high energy event. It was not a casual twist or reach. Mrs. Bigler quickly dove
diagonally across the counter in a vain attempt to catch the falling menu frame which
then shattered on the floor. It was a sudden twisting lunge at an angle across a waist
high counter top.
The quality or intensity of the activity involved with this person and this body
resulted in a low back injury. What Mrs. Bigler did was severe enough to meet the
higher standard. We submit that it was beyond usual exertions of normal non
employment life because of the force or violence of the event.
The Defendants submitted reports from their doctors, as well as from an
ergonomics specialist, in an attempt to show that the Petitioner's exertion did not reach
that of the type of activities mentioned in Allen which are commonly considered to be
typical non employment activities in late 20th Century life.1 However, HOW those
activities are performed has a major difference in the stress and exertion placed upon
the body. While a person with a preexisting low back condition who merely lifts a
small child to chest height and feels a sudden sharp low back pain may not have
sustained a legally compensable industrial accident as a result, the outcome could be

lr

The Allen case mentions such things as lifting a small child to chest height, changing a flat tire on a car,
climbing stairs in buildings, and taking full garbage cans to the street.
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entirely different if he, while lifting the child, or something of similar weight, has to
move suddenly in a jerking twisting movement while holding that weight.
Again, it is the quality or violence of the act that is the pivotal factor. The
intensity of the act is what brings the element of risk of injury to the job. As stated in
the Stouffer case, "The usualness or unusualness of a claimant's exertion must be
determined in its actual context." Stouffer at 183. This court has rejected the notion
that the ususalness or unusualness of an activity must be judged by a bright line test,
whether it be for weight or the just the general description of an activity. Smith &
Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989).
What happened to Mrs. Bigler at work is clearly within the type of injuries
which Allen and its progeny intended to be the ones that should meet the legal standard
of unusual or extraordinary exertion. The facts and circumstances of this case show
that the injury Mrs. Bigler sustained did not just comcidentally occur at work, but was
brought on by exertion required by the circumstances of her employment which
increased the risk of injury which a worker would otherwise normally face in life. See
Allen at 25.
The Industrial Commission improperly applied the Allen standard in this matter.
The Industrial Commission's order should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mrs. Bigler has met her burden of establishing legal causation under the higher
standard required by the Allen decision. The Industrial Commission has taken a too

9

restrictive interpretation of the Allen decision. The order of the Industrial Commission
should be reversed because of its improper interpretation and application of the law.
Dated t h i s j ^
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fillip B. Shell
Day & Barney
Attorneys for Petitioner May Bigler
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 94-273

MAY BIGLER,
Applicant,

*
*
*
*

INTERIM

ic

*

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

ic

TW SERVICES/TRANSPORTATION
INSURANCE,

ic

*

Defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ic

ORDER

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August
8, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by
Phillip Shell, Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation
(TTC) and medical expenses related to a March 11, 1993 industrial
back injury.
The defendants paid initial diagnostic expenses
following the March 11, 1993 injury, but currently deny all
liability for that injury. The defendants take the position that
the applicant did not sustain a compensable industrial accident on
March 11, 1993. The primary reason argued by the defendants for
the assertion of non-compensability is that the applicant cannot
establish legal cause related to that incident. Per the holding in
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), legal
cause is one of the two required elements of compensability. The
defendants argue that, in order to establish legal cause in this
case, the applicant must be able show that the incident on March
11, 1993 involved exertion beyond what is experienced by 20th
century individuals in their daily non-employment lives (ala
Allen). The defendants argue that this standard applies to this
case because the applicant has a contributory pre-exsiting
condition. Per the defendants, the incident on March 11, 1993 did
not involve any kind of unusual exertion and thus legal cause and
compensability are not established. The defendants rely in part on
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the opinions of Dr. T. Grange and Dr. D. Bloswick for the
proposition that the applicant's exertion on March 11, 1994 was
less than is required by the ruling in the Allen case.
The applicant concedes that she had a contributory preexisting back condition on March 11, 1993 and that she therefore
must show "unusual" exertion in order to establish the legal cause
requirement for compensability. The applicant argues that her
exertion on March 11, 1993 does meet the unusual exertion
requirement specified in Allen. Counsel for the applicant argued
at hearing that the opinions of Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick are
based on inaccurate facts regarding the nature of the applicant's
activity on March 11, 1993. As such, counsel finds the Grange and
Bloswick opinions to be irrelevant to the legal cause
determination.
At hearing, the ALJ indicated that she would make a ruling
on the threshold issue of compensability before she dealt with any
other issues that need to be resolved. The ALJ indicated that she
would first review the medical record exhibit submitted at hearing.
The ALJ indicated that she was not clear at hearing on whether or
not the other element of compensability, i.e. medical cause, was
also controverted.
She indicated that if legal cause was
established, she might feel the need to refer the matter to a
medical panel in order to get additional input on the other element
of compensability, i. e. medical cause.
After reviewing the
medical records, the ALJ makes the following factual findings.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a female who was 56 years old on the date
of injury, March 11, 1993, with no dependents at that time. The
applicant was employed as a cashier with TW Services on March 11,
1993, making $5.20 per hour and working 35 hours per week.
Although the applicant's current claim is with respect to the March
11, 1993 incident, the applicant did have another back incident a
year prior to her injury on March 11, 1993. On or about March 13,
1992, while at work for TW Services, the applicant was lifting a
tray of silverware/utensils which weighed approximately 10 pounds.
The applicant experienced back pain at that time and went to see
her then family doctor, Dr. Johnson. The applicant recalls that he
prescribed some muscle relaxers for her and other medical records
indicate that the applicant returned to work immediately. Per the
other records, the pain eased after about a month and the applicant
had no other back concerns until the March 11, 1993 incident.
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On the date of injury currently at issue, March 11, 1993,
the applicant was at work standing in front of her cash register.
The applicant's work station consisted of a cash register situated
in between two waist-high counters that ran from the register back
towards the applicant, continuing on behind her. The counters
allowed individuals to stand in line and set their cafeteria trays
on the counters, sliding them along until they reached the front of
the line where they paid the applicant for their food.
The
applicant stood in front of the register and had a counter running
along either side of her. On the opposite side of the register
from the applicant, and off to the right of the applicant, there
was an 8" x 11" sheet of paper with the daily menu on it, inserted
into a plastic stand.
The applicant testified that she was
standing in front of the register and somewhat to the left of it
when she noticed the menu start to fall off the counter on the
other side of the register. The applicant stated that she twisted
suddenly to the right and lunged forward to try to catch the
falling menu. As she did so, she needed to reach across the end of
the counter on the right side of the register with her right hand*
The applicant stated that this action was done very suddenly in an
attempt to catch the falling menu. She was unable to catch the
menu, but felt 3 sharp pain in her low back at approximately the
belt line as she lunged and reached at the same time.
The
applicant stated that she had left leg symptoms (pain and then
numbness and tingling) at about the same time.
The applicant was seen at St. Mark's Hospital on March 11,
1993 and was diagnosed with a lumbar strain. A lumbar spine X-ray
was read as normal. Medication was prescribed and the applicant
was advised to remain off work until March 17, 1993. She was
advised to follow-up with an orthopedist if she was not improved in
4 days time. However, the applicant apparently decided to see a
chiropractor the next day, March 12, 1993. An office note of Dr.
C Kesler, D.C indicates that on March 12, 1993, the applicant
needed the assistance of her son-in-law in order to walk, but was
able to walk on her own by March 15, 1993. The applicant had
approximately 8 chiropractic treatments by Dr. Kesler, for low back
pain and left leg pain, between March 12, 1993 and March 31, 1993.
The applicant was released by Dr. Kesler to return to work on March
29, 1993 and the applicant apparently did return to work at that
time, continuing with chiropractic treatments in April 1993. In
April 1993, the applicant had just 5 treatments by Dr. Kesler.
On May 5, 1993, Dr. Kesler referred the applicant to Salt
Lake MRI Services for an MRI of the lumbar spine. The MRI was read
to show a degenerated disc at L4-5, with a small herniation and
mild disc bulge, degenerated discs a L5-S1 and L3-4 with no
herniations and Tll-12 and T12-L1 degenerated discs with disc
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bulges. The applicant had chiropractic treatments in May 1993 and
also was seen on May 11, 1993 by an orthopedist, Dr. S. Coleman,
and a neurologist, Dr. P. Bray, at the request of the carrier. Dr.
Bray's report indicates that he understood that the applicant was
reaching for something and twisting on March 11, 1993 when she
experienced left low back pain. He noted that she had been wearing
a back brace and felt that the chiropractic treatments had improved
her pain 50%.
The applicant stated at hearing that the
chiropractic treatments seemed only to help during the treatment.
Dr. Bray noted possible osteoporosis on an X-ray and found no
evidence of neurological compromise. His impression was that the
applicant had been having back pain over a period of years, with it
getting worse during the past year. He concluded that the March
11, 1993 injury was a doubtful source of her then current symptoms
and he found that the osteoporosis could be the cause of her
symptoms. He recommended hormone therapy for the osteoporosis,
considering that the applicant had had her ovaries removed.
Dr. Coleman, the orthopedist who saw the applicant on May
11, 1993, also noted on and off back pain for one full year. He
found
that
the
X-rays
did
show
modest
degrees
of
osteoporosis/osteopenia with some loss of disc space at T12-L1. He
found that both of these were surely "ancient findings." He found
that it would be highly speculative to conclude that the March 1992
and March 1993 episodes were causing the degree of persisting back
pain that the applicant described. Dr. Coleman concluded that the
applicant did not need further treatment and would reach maximum
medical improvement without treatment in 2-3 months. He concluded
that she was suffering from a combination of: 1) osteoporosis, 2)
possible old healed compression fractures and 3) common mildly
herniated discs that everyone has at a certain age.
The applicant discontinued work on May 19, 1993 (because she
couldn't stand the pain any more per her hearing testimony) and
continued with chiropractic care through July 10, 1993. Per Dr.
Kesler's records, the applicant had 16 treatments between May 17,
1993 and July 20, 1993. On May 21, 1993, he prepared a note for
the applicant that indicates that she was totally disabled. The
note does not specify a time period for the disability. Dr. Kesler
referred the applicant to Dr. W. Muir at the Intermountain Spine
Institute for a second opinion in September 1993. In his letter
referring her over to Dr. Muir, Dr. Kesler indicates that the
applicant was injured pursuant to a rapid sudden jerking movement
on March 11, 1993 in which she was trying to prevent a menu from
falling off a counter. He notes in his September 13, 1993 letter
to Dr. Muir that it was his opinion that the applicant's complaints
were related to the March 11, 1993 and were not soley the result of
her pre-existing conditions of osteoporosis and degeneration that
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were noted by Dr. Bray and Dr. Coleman. Dr. Muir's September 14,
1993 report indicates that he found no significant impingement of
the thecal sac or nerve roots in the bottom 3 lumbar degenerated
discs. His impression was: multi-level degenerated discs with
possible instability and associated pain. He noted that he found
the applicant's symptoms to be out of proportion to her findings
and therefore questioned the existence of psychogenic or economic
factors effecting the lack of improvement.
He recommended a
psychological evaluation and then possibly a discogram thereafter
depending on the results of the psychological evaluation.
On December 16, 1993, Dr. Kesler, D.C. prepared a Summary
of Medical Record form inidcating that the applicant was still not
released for work at that time. He notes on the form that the
applicant had an L4-5 disc herniation related to the March 11, 1993
injury and that the applicant might need additional treatment. He
indicates on the form that he felt that the applicant had an 11%
whole person impairment, with no aggravation of a pre-existing
condition.
On February 16, 1994, Dr. J. McGlothlin, saw the applicant
after her family physician, Dr. R. Stubbs, referred her over to
him. The applicant indicated at hearing that Dr. Stubbs had been
prescribing pain medication for her back pain. In addition, Dr.
Stubbs had been seeing the applicant for chest pain and shoulder
pain since May 1993 and had been monitoring her blood pressure.
Dr. McGlothlin was unable to come to any definitive conclusions
without further testing, but he noted the following diagnoses: low
back syndrome consisting of 1) lumbosacral musculoligamentous
sprain/strain syndrome, chronic, 2) probable left sacroiliac joint
sprain/strain syndrome, chronic, 3) L4-5 and L5-S1 disc
degeneration with mild disc bulging and grade I-II bulge at L4-5
and 4) no evidence of radiculopathy or lower extremity
mononeuropathy. Dr. McGlothlin indicated that he wanted to see the
actual MRI film, a hip X-ray and an EMG to help him rule out left
hip degenerative arthropathy, symptom magnification and adjustment
reaction. No further follow-up with Mr. McGlothlin occurred.
On April 6, 1994, Dr. Kesler, D.C. completed another Summary
of Medical Record form. This form indicates that the applicant was
off work from March 12, 1993 to April 6, 1994 with no prediction as
to when the applicant would reach a final state of recovery. He
noted only that the applicant was unchanged from Februrary 14,
1994. The form indicates a 10% whole person impairment with the
industrial accident apparently causing the L4-5 disc herniation.
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At the bottom of the form, he indicates that the applicant had
asymptomatic osteoporosis and a disc herniation (level unspecified)
prior to the March 11, 1993 injury.
On June 17, 1994, Dr. T. Grange of WORKMED examined the
applicant at the request of th€» carrier. Dr. Grange noted that the
applicant had been receiving Social Security Disability since June
of 1993. He indicates that his understanding of the incident on
March 11, 1993 was that the applicant reached 25° to the right for
a falling menu that was about 2 feet away.
He noted that the
applicant at that time needed to lie down about 3/4 of the day and
drove only short distances occasionally.
He noted that the
applicant had her daughter do her grocery shopping and that she
only occasionally tried to prepare a meal. Dr. Grange's impression
was that the applicant had chronic low back pain that was
multifactorial in nature. He noted that the applicant perceived
that the March 11, 1993 incident was responsible for markedly
limiting her activity and for causing her constant severe low back
pain. Dr. Grange found that the applicant's symptom course was
markedly unusual considering the "low energy mechamism of the
injury." He noted that one would have expected a quick resolution
and return to work after the isolated incident on March 11, 1993,
especially considering that the applicant had a fairly light duty
job. He found that there were objective findings for significant
psychosocial overlay and pain magnification.
Dr. Grange notes other diagnoses to be: 1) pre-existing
degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine, 2) L4-5
small disc herniation which was not significant neurologically (Dr.
Grange noted that it was impossible to know whether this herniation
existed prior to March 11, 1993, but found that it would not have
been uncommon for it to have been present independent of the March
11, 1993 incident), 3) moderate kyphosis, thoracolumbar scoliosis
and osteoporosis of long-standing nature, 4) heart disease with
bypass and chronic anti-coagulation therapy, 5) COPD with history
of remote smoking, 6) delayed recovery and delayed return to work.
Dr. Grange explained that the applicant's inability to exercise due
to her heart condition complicated her recovery from the back pain.
He found that surgery was not recommended and that counseling and
pain management was recommended. He noted that he found that the
March 11, 1993 incident was an ordinary routine activity and that
there was no direct relationship between the industrial event and
her current medical conditions. He found that the applicant was
stable at that time, both from a neurological and a musculoskeletal
standpoint.
He rated the applicant as having 5% whole person
impairment for her lumbar spine, all related to pre-existing
conditions, with no impairment associated with the March 11, 1993
incident.
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Donald E. Bloswick, Ph.D., of Industrial Ergonomics
Incorporated, was asked to offer an opinion/analysis of the
exertive force involved in the applicant's March 11, 1993
industrial event as compared to changing a tire or lifting a small
child, activities noted in the Allen case cited above as not
involving unusual exertion. Bloswick concluded from watching a
video tape showing the nature of the applicant/s reach on March 11,
1993 that the industrial incident involved a compressive force of
504 pounds. Compressive forces on the low back for lifting a small
child and lifting a tire were listed as ranging from 604 pounds to
1155 pounds. Per this information, Bloswick concluded that the low
back stresses experienced by the applicant in "reaching for the
menu" were less than the low back stress occasioned by lifting a
small child or lifting a tire.
In closing argument, counsel for the defendants argued that
Bloswick/s analysis shows that, on March 11, 1993, the applicant
was not involved in "unusual exertion" beyond what is experienced
by 20th century individuals in their non-employment lives, as this
is defined in the Allen case. Per counsel for the defedants, this,
in combination with the applicant's contributory pre-existing
condition, makes the applicant's March 11, 1993 incident noncompensable. Counsel for the applicant counters that Bloswick was
analyzing merely a reach for a menu card, and not a sudden lunge
with a twist as the applicant described her work injury. As such,
counsel for the applicant argues that Bloswick's conclusions do not
assist in making a determination regarding the "usualness" of the
applicant's exertion on March 11, 1993.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ finds that the applicant's industrial incident on
March 11, 1993 occurred as she described it at hearing, i.e. as
involving a sudden lunge with a twist to right. There has been no
evidence presented indicating that the incident was merely a 2-foot
reach to the right as the defendants have described the incident to
their chosen examining physicians and experts. The mere fact that
the applicant was attempting to catch a falling object suggests
that her actions were sudden and the fact that she needed to get
her arm around the cash register and over the counter suggest that
a significant reach/lunge was necessary. The ALJ finds that this
kind of twisting lunge is not normally a part of everday nonemployment life in the 20th century, as it is described in the
Allen case cited above, and finds that this activity is
sufficiently "unusual" to meet the additional risk/causation factor
that the Allen case finds is necessary for compensability where
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there is a contributory pre-existing condition.
The ALJ also
agrees with counsel for the applicant that the Bloswick analysis of
compressive force is not supportive of the defendants' position in
this matter, simply because Bloswick did not analyze the activity
that was truly invovled on March 11, 1993.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the ALJ finds that the
applicant has established unusual exertion on the date of injury
and thereby has established the legal cause element of
compensability. However, the compensability analysis also requires
a finding of medical cause and the ALJ finds that the evidence with
respect to medical cause at this point is very unclear. All the
doctors concede the existence of one or more contributory preexisting conditions in the spine. The evidence as a whole seems to
suggest that some kind of aggravation or "lighting up" of symptoms
occurred as a result of the March 11, 1993 incident. However, it
is unclear from the evidence in the medical record exhibit whether
the applicant has stabilized from the effects of the incident and
when she did stabilize from the incident if she has in fact already
stablized.
There also appears to be medical controversy with
respect to whether or not any permanent impairment occurred as a
result of the industrial incident on March 11, 1993. These medical
factors need to be resolved before it can be determined whether
benefits are due the applicant and in what amount. Considering the
fact that the examining/treating physicians differ with respect to
these issues, the ALJ feels a medical panel referral is
appropriate.
The ALJ will therefore direct the applicant's attorney to
arrange to have the inital X-ray films taken at St. Mark's Hospital
and the MRI flim taken at Salt Lake MRI referred to the ALJ so that
a medical panel referral can be accomplished. Any Motions for
Review based on the findings and conclusions stated in this Interim
Order should be withheld and filed after the ALJ has issued her
final order in this matter. Those Motions for Review will be
considered timely filed if filed with the ALJ within 3 0 days of the
final order.
INTERIM ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's attorney
arrange to have the relevant X-ray films referred to the ALJ so
that a medical panel referral can be accomplished.

INTERIM ORDER
RE: MAY BIGLER
PAGE 9

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final ruling will be issued
once the medical panel referral is accomplished and that any
objections or requests for review of the interim rulings noted in
this order will be considered timely if filed within 30 days of the
final ALJ order in this matter.
DATED this [j

day of August, 1994.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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I certify that on August 1 / , 1994, a copy of the attached
Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case
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Attorney at Law
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FINAL
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*

Defendants.
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BEFORE:
APPEARANCES:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.
The applicant was represented by Phillip Shell,
Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer,
Attorney.

On August 17, 1994, the ALJ issued Interim Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order in the above-referenced matter. That
Interim Order deals with only one issue, legal cause, and resolves
that issue only. This final order resolves the remaining issues
involved in this case.
In their answer to the applicant's application for hearing,
the defendants specified that the applicant was not entitled to
benefits related to the March 11, 1993 work incident at issue,
because she did not sustain a compensable work accident at that
time. The defendants argued that the applicant could show neither
medical nor legal cause, both of which must be established for
compensability, per Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15
(Utah 1986). Because all evidence pertinent to the legal cause
issue was before the ALJ at the completion of the hearing on August
8, 1994, the ALJ decided to issue an interim ruling on that issue
alone, as resolution of that issue could have resulted in no
further need for litigation. After reviewing the medical records
and the applicant's hearing testimony, the ALJ concluded that the
applicant had met her burden of showing "unusual exertion," so as
to establish legal cause. The Interim Order fully discusses the
ALJ's findings and reasons for so concluding.
In the Interim
Order, after explaining her reasons for ruling in the applicant's
favor on the legal cause issue, the ALJ noted that the medical
causal element of compensability still required resolution.
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Because the ALJ found that the medical records contained
of clarity on the medical causal connection between
incident and subsequent symptoms and treatment, the ALJ
she would refer the medical cause issue to a medical
additional input on that issue.

some lack
the work
indicated
panel for

After collection of X-rays, the matter was referred over to
the medical panel on October 19, 1994. The medical panel report
was received at the Commission on December 21, 1994 and was
distributed to the parties on December 22, 1994, with 15 days
allowed for filing objections. The ALJ granted the defendants'
request for an extension of time to file objections to the medical
panel report. The defendants' objections were filed on January 24,
1995. The applicant responded to the objections on February 7,
1995 and the defendants filed a reply to the applicant's response
on February 22, 1995. The matter was considered ready for order on
February 7, 1995, but the ALJ is considering all evidence and
argument submitted to date, in making her final decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
For purpose of factual findings related to the issue of
medical cause, the ALJ hereby incorporates the Findings of Fact
specified in the August 17, 1994 Interim Order.
The medical panel consisted of chairman, Dr. M. Thomas, a
neurologist, panelmember, Dr. A. 0. Smoot, an orthopedist, and
panelmember, Dr. R. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist. The medical panel
was requested to answer questions dealing with: the medical causal
connection between the March 11, 1993 industrial event and the
applicant's back problems, the date the applicant stabilized from
the effects of the March 11, 1993 accident, permanent impairment
pre-existing the accident and caused by the accident, and what
treatment was/will be necessary as a result of the accident. The
panel concluded that there was a medical causal connection between
the March 11, 1994 work incident and applicant's current back
problems.
The panel commented: "the panel is impressed that
something significant occurred at the time of the accident, which
led to her immediate symptoms, which have persisted over time since
then." The panel concluded that the applicant was stable in April
of 1994, as it appeared that her condition has remained the same
since that time. With respect to impairment, the panel found that
the applicant had an overall 5% whole person impairment to the low
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back, with 1.7% whole person attributable to the March 11, 1993
accident and 3.3% whole person attributable to pre-existing
conditions. In addition, the panel found that the applicant had a
5% whole person impairment for somatoform pain disorder. Past
medical care was found to be related to the March 11, 1993
industrial accident. Infrequent orthopedic follow-up, and possibly
attendance at a pain clinic, were recommended as future treatment.
OBJECTIONS TO THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT:
The basic premise of counsel for the defendants' Objections
to the Medical Panel Report is that the ALJ improperly influenced
the panel's decision on medical cause, by discussing her reasons
for ruling in favor of the applicant on the legal cause issue in
the Interim Order. Counsel argues that the ALJ's discussion in the
Interim Order regarding the reliability/applicability of the
analyses made by Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick, resulted in the panel
being influenced to discount the opinions of Dr. Grange and Dr.
Bloswick.
Per counsel, the ALJ improperly concluded that Dr.
Bloswick and Dr. Grange had relied on inaccurate information
regarding the nature of the applicant's activities on March 11,
1993. Counsel argues that Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick had the same
information regarding what occurred on that date as was provided at
hearing and thus their opinions regarding the exertion required on
March 11, 1993, and Dr. Grange's opinion regarding the lack of a
medical causal connection between the work incident and the
subsequent symptoms/treatment, are valid reliable opinions.
Counsel apparently argues that if the ALJ had so concluded, the
panel would have given more credit to the opinions of Dr. Grange
and Dr. Bloswick and would not have been influenced to discount
their opinions, as did the ALJ. Presumably, counsel argues that
had the panel given more credit to the opinions of Dr. Grange and
Dr. Bloswick, the panel would have found no medical causal
connection between the industrial accident and the subsequent
developing back symptoms.
Counsel for the applicant responds to the above argument,
noting first that Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick both describe the
applicant's activity on the date of injury as involving merely a
"reach.'1 Counsel states that, even if the deposition transcript
indicating a lunge and a jerk was provided to the doctors, neither
doctor seemed to take careful note of the lunge/jerk testimony and
rather analyzed the relevant activity as involving merely a reach*
Counsel argues that this reference to merely a reach is more in
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line with what counsel for the defendants states in his cover
letter to the doctors than it is with what the applicant stated at
her deposition and her hearing. With respect to the defendants,
argument that the ALJ's discounting of the opinions of Dr. Bloswick
and Dr. Grange caused the panel to also discount those opinions,
counsel argues that the panel had the full reports of Dr. Bloswick
and Dr. Grange and there is nothing to in the panel report to
indicate that they wholly discounted those reports.
Counsel for the defendants' reply to counsel for the
applicant's response states that the ALJ incorrectly emphasized the
unusualness of the activity engaged in by the applicant on the date
of injury, as opposed to the unusualness of the exertion engaged in
at that time. Counsel argues that, had the ALJ correctly focused
on the unusualness of the exertion, she would have found Dr.
Bloswick's compressive force analysis to be directly on point,
instead of having discounted it (and to follow the argument
through, the ALJ presumes that counsel contends that this in turn
would have caused the panel to give more credit to the Bloswick
compressive force analysis). With respect to the work activity
facts used by Bloswick in making his analysis, counsel argues that
Bloswick's report recounts facts and information not in counsel's
cover letter to Bloswick, and thus this shows that Bloswick had the
applicant's testimony (i.e. lunge and jerk) in mind when he did his
analysis, and not merely counsel's indication of mere reaching.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel on the
issue of the medical causal connection between the March 11, 1993
work incident and the subsequent developing back problems,
treatment and related impairment.
The ALJ does so primarily
because there are no other well-founded medical opinions that
directly controvert the findings of the medical panel on the
medical causal issue. Dr. Grange does conclude that he felt the
applicant's symptom course was an unusual one to follow such a
"low-energy mechanism" as that involved in the industrial accident.
However, as has been discussed in the Interim Order, it does not
appear that Dr. Grange had accurate facts to rely on in making his
assessment of what was involved on the date of injury. In the only
place in his report where he describes the industrial event, he
quotes directly from counsel for the defendants cover letter which
indicates that the industrial incident involved a mere reaching 25°
to the right. The ALJ would also consider this description to be
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a "low-energy" activity, but this description is not what the
applicant described in her deposition and her hearing testimony and
it is not what the ALJ found was involved on the date of injury.
Based on his statements in his June 17, 1994 report, Dr. Grange was
analyzing an activity that counsel for the defendant described to
him and was not basing his analysis on the actual facts of the
relevant activity, even if he had the actual facts provided to him
by way of the applicant's deposition transcript. Just because Dr.
Grange was given the applicant's deposition transcript, doesn't
mean he read it or relied upon it. It appears evident from his
report that he probably did not.
Therefore, considering Dr.
Grange's conclusions are based on an activity that is different
from what the ALJ has found actually occurred, the ALJ finds that
his report is not well-founded and therefore does not conflict with
the panel report (which analyzes the correct facts as specified in
the ALJ's Interim Order).
The ALJ should note that she finds no other medical
opinions, besides that of Dr. Grange, that can be interpreted to
conflict with the medical panel's causal anlysis. Dr. Coleman did
indicate that he did not feel that all of the applicant's symptoms
were related to the industrial injuries alone, but he did not
exclude any causal connection with the March 11, 1993 incident.
His opinion is not in conflict with the panel conclusions, as the
panel notes that the applicant does have significant pre-existing
impairment to the low back and thus not all of her problems are
solely related to the industrial injury. Based on the lack of any
medical opinions truly conflicting with that of the panel, and
based on the fact that the panel has provided a thorough, wellinformed and logical causal analysis, the ALJ finds the panel
conclusions should be adopted.
With respect to the objections to the medical panel report,
the ALJ does not agree that the panel has been improperly
influenced in any way by an unrelated finding made by the ALJ or by
the ALJ's discussion of her reasoning behind the unrelated finding.
The panel was specifically instructed to deal just with the issue
of medical cause and the panel was given all the relevant medical
evidence and other expert opinion that was offered at the hearing
to consider in making its analysis. The ALJ specifically directed
the panel to rely on the facts stated in the Interim Order and
there is nothing in the panel report that indicates to the ALJ that
the panel was relying on anything but the facts stated in the ALJ's
Interim Order. The ALJ finds it purely speculative to suggest that
the panel was unduely influenced by the ALJ's discounting of the
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opinions of Dr. Bloswick and Dr. Grange. The panel had the full
reports of those doctors and the ALJ knows of no reason why the
panel would be more influenced by something the ALJ indicated as
opposed to something that one of their own medical colleagues
stated. In actuality, the ALJ believes that most medical panels
base their decisions on their own expert analysis and are not
unduly influenced by the opinions or statements of any one
physician or other individual.
With respect to the argument that the ALJ analyzed the
unusualness of the activity as opposed to the unusualness.of the
exertion, the ALJ should clarify that she did in fact consider the
sudden twisting lunge on the date of injury to involve unusual
exertion. The Interim Order does state this conclusion in terms of
the activity being unusual, but the ALJ was focusing on the
exertion involved in the activity when she made her conclusions.
The ALJ should note that she does find that the type of evidence
supplied by Dr. Bloswick (i.e. the compressive force analysis) can
be very helpful in analyzing the "unusal exertion" requirement for
legal cause. It can be difficult at times to compare exertion
levels, as is required by Allen unusual exertion test. Expert
analysis in this area is very helpful, provided the expert is
analyzing the correct activity. In the instant case, the ALJ finds
that the expert was analyzing an activity suggested to him by
counsel and not the activity that was actually involved. In future
cases, the ALJ would certainly accept well-founded compressive
force analysis evidence and might even welcome this additional
evidence.
Based on the medical panel conclusions, the applicant has
established medical cause. Legal cause was found established in
the Interim Order. Medical and legal cause established, the ALJ
finds that the applicant sustained a compensable industrial
accident on March 11, 1993. Benefits are thus payable per the
medical panel conclusions regarding stability and permanent
impairment.
Per the panel report, the applicant is entitled to temporary
total compensation (TTC) for the periods off work from the date of
injury until April 1994, when the applicant stabilized per the
medical panel. The ALJ finds that Dr. Kesler's records indicate a
need to be off work until April 6, 1994 and thus the ALJ will use
that date in April for the end of TTC. Per the ALJ's Interim
Order, the applicant worked between March 29, 1993 and May 19, 1993
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and thus the periods of TTC to be awarded are from March 12, 1993
through March 28, 1993 (2.429 weeks) and May 19, 1993 through April
5, 1994 (46 weeks) .
Her average weekly wage, per her
representations on the application for hearing (that have not been
specifcially denied), is based on 35 hours/week at $5.20/hour, or
$182.00/week. The compensation rate is thus $121.00/week ($182.00
x .667 = $121.39) when rounded off as reguired by U.C.A. 35-1-75.
The total TTC award is therefore $5,859.91 ($121.00 x 48.429).
Permanent impairment benefits (PPI) are based on a total of 6*7%
whole person impairment (5% for the somatoform pain disorder and
1.7% for the permanent aggravation to the low back caused by the
March 11, 1993 accident). The PPI award is thus 20.9 weeks (312
weeks x .067) at $121.00/week, or $2,528.90. Attorney fees are
based on 20% of the full award of compensation, per R568-1-7, and
amount to $8,388.81 ($5,859.91 for TTC + $2,528.90 for PPI) x.20,
or $1,677.76.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay the applicant, May Bigler,
temporary total compensation at the rate of $121.00 per week, for
48.429 weeks, or a total of $5,859.91, for the periods of medical
instability associated with the March 11, 1993 industrial accident
from March 11, 1993 through March 28, 1993 and from May 19, 1993
through April 5, 1994. That amount is accrued and due and payable
in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78,
and less the attorney fees to be awarded below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay the applicant, May Bigler,
permanent impairment benefits at the rate of $121.00 per week, for
20.9 weeks, or a total of $2,528.90, for the 6.7% whole person
impairment sustained as a result of the March 11, 1993 industrial
accident. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump
sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred
as the result of the March 11, 1993 industrial accident as
specified by the medical panel appointed in this matter; said
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.

FINAL ORDER
RE: MAY BIGLER
PAGE 8

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay Phillip Shell, attorney for
the applicant, the sum of $1,677.76, plus 20% of the interest
payable on the applicant's award, per R568-1-7, for services
rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid
award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office
of Phillip Shell.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2) Utah Code Annotated.

DATED this^P^/ day of March, 1995.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March ^)Lj , 1995, a copy of the attached
Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case
of May Bigler, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:
May Bigler
3810 South Redwood Road, #2 04
West Valley City, UT 84119
Phillip Shell
Attorney at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
Michael Dyer
Attorney at Law
77 West 200 South, Suite 400
SLC, UT 84101
CNA Insurance
P 0 BOX 17369 TA
Denver,CO 80217

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
MAY BIGLER,

*

Applicant,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.

*
*
*

T. W. SERVICES, INC. and
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO.

*
*

Case No. 94-0273

Defendants.

*

T. W. Services, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance
carrier, Transportation Insurance Co. (referred to jointly as "T.
W. Services" hereafter) ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to
review the Administrative Lawr Judge's award of benefits to May
Bigler pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW
Has Ms. Bigler established that her accident of March 11, 1993
is the legal cause of the injuries for which she seeks workers'
compensation benefits.
Because the Industrial Commission finds
this issue dispositive, it does not address other issues raised in
T. W. Services' motion for review.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Because the parties agree that Ms. Bigler suffered a
preexisting back conditions that required her to meet the
higherstandard of legal causation announced in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), it is unnecessary to detail
the nature and extent of such preexisting conditions, which are
documented in the medical record.
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As to the accident of March 11, 1993, the Industrial
Commission adopts the ALJ's finding, which can be summarized as
follows: Ms. Bigler worked as a cashier in*a cafeteria, standing
behind a cash register located between two waist-high counters. A
copy of the daily menu was held in a light-weight plastic stand in
front of the cash register, approximately two feet away from Ms.
Bigler.
,
I
At the time of the accident, Ms. Bigler saw the menu begin to
fall.
She twisting 25 degrees to the right and lunged forward
across the counter in an unsuccessful attempt to catch the menu.
As she did so, she felt a sharp pain in her low back. Ms. Bigler
now seeks workers7 compensation benefits for this injury.
PISCVSSZQN AflD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides
benefits for workers injured by accident arising out of and in the
course of their employment. A person suffering from a preexisting
condition is not necessarily disqualified from receiving workers'
compensation benefits. However, in order to establish that the
injury arises out of and' in the course of employment, "a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his condition." Allen, 729 P.2d
at 25. This requirement, referred to as "legal causation", is met
when the claimant demonstrates some exertion greater than that
experienced in typical, modern nonemployment life. Allen, 72 9 P. 2d
at 26.
I
I
i

The Industrial Commission has carefully considered the nature
of Ms. Bigler's exertion on March 11, 1993.
The Industrial
Commission notes that, not infrequently, objects fall from tables,
desks, countertops and shelves. Consequently, it is not unusual
for persons to make sudden twisting and lunging movements to
attempt to catch such objects. Ms. Bigler's similar activity at
work on March 11, 1993 was not atypical of risks generally faced
everyday in nonemployment life.
I
Based on the foregoing, the Industrial Commission finds Ms.
Bigler has failed to establish that her accident while employed at
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T. W. Services meets the higher test for legal causation required
by Allen. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Ms.
Bigler's injury is not compensable under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
In light of the Industrial Commission's determination that Ms.
Bigler has failed to establish legal causation, it is unnecessary
to address other issues raised in T. W. Services' motion for
review.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission hereby grants T. W. Services' motion
for review and reverses the ALJ's award of benefits to Ms. Bigler.
The Industrial Commission denies Ms. Bigler's claim for workers'
compensation benefits on the grounds her injury did not arise out
of her employment at T. W. Services. It is so ordered.
Dated this ^ ^ day of September, 1995.

IMPORTANT!

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS.
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order by filing a. request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission
within
20 days of the date
of
this
order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0
days of the date of this Order.
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion
For Review in the matter of May Bigler, Case No. 94-02 73, was
mailed first class postage prepaid this J2 f day of September, 1995,
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WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84119
MICHAEL DYER, ATTORNEY
77 WEST 200 SOUTH #400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
PHILLIP SHELL, ATTORNEY
4 5 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107

"Me 11 Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
MAY BIGLER,

*
*

Applicant/

*

ORDER EXTENDING TIME
FOR RECONSIDERATION

*

T. W. SERVICES, INC. and
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO.

*
*

Case No. 94-0273

*

Defendants.

*

On October

18, 1995, May Bigler

Reconsideration in the above entitled matter.

filed

a Motion

For

Under §63-46b-13 of

the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, such a motion is deemed
denied unless the Commission issues its Order within 20 days.
However, pursuant to §63-46b-l(9) of the Act, the Commission may
extend, for good cause, the 20 day period.
To allow other parties to respond to Mrs. Bigler's Motion and
to allow the Industrial Commission of Utah sufficient time to
properly consider the matter, the period for determination of
Mrs. Bigler1s Motion For Reconsideration is hereby extended as
follows:
1.

Other parties may respond to the Motion in writing no

later than November 17, 1995.
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2.

The Commission will issue its decision on the Motion no

later than December 8, 1995.

DATED this 3&£- day of November, 1995.

frflDuu.
Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

/^r^t^sg^ ^/^r^^^r^ _
Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAIMNC
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Extending Time
for Reconsideration in the matter of May Bigler, Case No. 94-0273,
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was mailed first class postage prepaid this ? ^ ^

day of November

1995, to the following:

MAY BIGLER
3810 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD #2049
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84119
MICHAEL DYER, ATTORNEY
77 WEST 200 SOUTH #400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
PHILLIP SHELL, ATTORNEY
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107

/

Phylli^/ Olson
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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